

THE LAWS OF RATIONAL SOCIETY¹

Abstract. What are the laws of society? *Way of life theory* (WOLT) relates every rational, social value to every other rational, social value in a strict, falsifiable theory which finds four mutually incompatible ways of life interrelated via three “dimensions” which contain all matters which must be taken into account in order to live socially.

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1. How does society work?

Physics has its laws relating matter and energy, biology has its systems of cooperating organs, ecology has its interactions between species and environments. What are the parts of society and how do they fit together? What are the laws of society?

Way of life theory (WOLT) provides the answer for that part of our social existence which is rational.

¹ I thank Angus Algie for feedback on drafts of this paper which attempts to state *Way of life theory* concisely yet comprehensively. Elaborations, justifications and academic context can be found at:

http://www.pepperday.eu/wolt/files/Social_science_as_science.pdf

2. Five types of people, five types of social relations

2.1. Consider *competition* and *cooperation*. Everyone thinks these exist. Let us assume they can be present or absent and that persons have preferences for them.

There are four possible extreme views.

1. accept competition and reject cooperation;
2. accept both;
3. accept cooperation and reject competition;
4. reject both.

These four options include everyone's preferences and no one is counted twice. They are represented in Table 1 which sets the *competition* options as a Y dimension and *cooperation* as an X dimension.

Table 1. Views of competition and cooperation

		Y	
Com- petition	Yes	1	2
	No	4	3
		No	Yes
		X Cooperation	

2.2. If we assume these four theoretical persons think logically and consistently, what sort of society would each type prefer?

The **Type 1**, who thinks people **should compete and not cooperate**, must fear cooperation will undermine or interfere with competition. Cooperation must be some sort of crafty coercion such as favouritism or collusion for competitive advantage. To compete and not cooperate, individuals must interact warily, negotiating one-on-one, competing for advantage. *Politically, this Type 1 would be libertarian, and favour the "dry," free-market right.*

The **Type 2**, who **accepts both competition and cooperation**, must reconcile significant contradictions. This will require rules setting out when to compete and when to cooperate. Rules must be enforced which requires a command structure, so society needs to be hierarchical, where people compete with those of the same rank, cooperate with superiors and coerce subordinates.

Politically, the Type 2 would be Tory, and support the “wet,” traditional right.

The **Type 3**, who **wants cooperation and rejects competition**, must fear the latter will undermine the former, must be objecting to the struggle, worried the consequent inequalities would give rise to a coercive, dog-eat-dog society. Type 3s must want everyone equal, so that people can harmoniously cooperate with each other. *Type 3s would be “progressive” and support the political left.*

The **Type 4**, who **rejects both competition and cooperation** must see them as pointless or dangerous. This would restrict social relations to the random or the coercive. Type 4s must live in a capricious world where cause and effect are unrelated, where what you get is a matter of luck. *Politically, the 4s would be what others say they are: right if populist, left if unionised.*

From preferences for competition and cooperation, four mindsets and four preferred patterns of social interaction logically follow—four *ways of life* or ideologies or moralities. To cover all theoretical possibilities let us allow for a **Type 5** who **has no preferences** regarding competition and cooperation. This way of life must be non-social, a hermit or recluse, and we cannot infer a moral stance.

2.3. The five types of mindset and social structure appear unambiguous: any ordinary understanding of *competition* and *cooperation* deductively yields those types and no others. That is, the deductions are genuine: they are not possibilities and not probabilities but theoretical inevitabilities.

This unambiguousness is facilitated by the contrast between the two concepts which renders their inherent vagueness immaterial. Had the two been similar or had they been unrelated, unequivocal deduction would have been difficult.

The connection between individual values and social structure has been a mystery for thousands of years. Has simple deduction solved it?

3. The five types in the real world





3.1. The five WOLT types are theoretical; real people are not perfectly logical and do not think in such absolute extremes. Still, if real people must take competition and cooperation into account

then, to the extent they are logical and extreme, the types must exist. Approximate examples are actually plentiful.

1. Mistrustful, **individualist 1s** are *doers* seeking opportunities, who want to be free—free to interact, explore nature, innovate, develop special skills, and compete to win, to gain esteem, wealth. Examples would be Columbus, Napoleon, Milton Friedman, Elon Musk, Donald Trump, Dirty Harry.
2. Measured, **hierarchist 2s** are *rulers* who value propriety and the tried-and-true, who expect properly qualified personnel to apply rules to categorise and manage orderly social activity. Real examples would be Confucius, any bureaucracy, the Catholic church, Sir Humphrey Appleby.
3. Trusting, **egalitarian 3s** are *carer/critics* who see inequality creating discord and waste, who want to “break down the barriers” inhibiting harmonious interaction among equals. Examples are Jesus, St Francis, Marxism, feminism, John Maynard Keynes, Chomsky, Atticus Finch.
4. Spontaneous, **fatalist 4s** are *battlers* subject to fate and powerful people. At once mistrustful and gullible, they interact unsystematically in a world of luck and compulsion. Examples: Lumpenproletariat, Chaplin’s Tramp, Steptoe and Son, Jerry Springer’s guests, Li’l Abner, Homer Simpson.
5. The aloof, **autonomous Type 5 loner**, detached from social engagement, free of the rat race, appears as Taoism, some Buddhism, Diogenes, Lao-Tzi, Thoreau, Steppenwolf, Garbo, Ignatius J Reilly.

For more examples, see page T5 of the *Ways of life table* at Appendix 3.

3.2. Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical social relations of the five types. The connecting lines represent reciprocal obligations between people.

Figure 1. Five patterns of social relations**Type 1 individualist networks****Type 2 hierarchy****Type 3 egalitarian group****Type 4 fatalist isolation****Type 5 autonomy**

3.3. Values are not just held by individual persons: a chamber of commerce would have a Type 1 outlook, a Freemasons lodge would be 2-ist, a greens party 3-ist, and a rioting mob 4-ist. Such groups should be more true to the theoretical type than individuals since the common cause would smooth out the idiosyncrasies of their individual members. Type 1 and Type 3 organisations will have elements of 2-ism, such as a constitution and office-holders, but little pageantry or ritual.

3.4. Socially, in the real world the types have their difficulties with disruptions by unruly, illogical human beings. For example, the competitive **Type 1** way of life fights a never-ending battle with the menace of cooperation. Laws against it are passed, large firms are broken up and fined for price fixing, and personnel are arraigned for nepotism and bribery. **Type 2** discipline, deference, and information restriction, indispensable for armies and bureaucracy, struggles with gossip, turf wars, intrigue and mutiny, while its attempts to regulate sex generate prudery and bizarre practices. The **Type 3** emphasis on concord, and the difficulty of disciplinary action among equals, can lead to public confession of sins, charismatic leadership, cultism, and schism. The **Type 4** is likely to lash out when blows outweigh windfalls which will cause trouble but be ineffective and often self-

destructive. 4s may find relief from isolation, uncertainty, mistrust, and short-termism at the bottom of a 2-ist hierarchy.

3.5. It is a cliché that “everyone’s different.” But *how* are they different? Academic psychology, sociology, etc have many social typologies (see Appendix 5) but none are realistic enough to give actual names in illustration. The paradoxical reason is that those schemes are inferred from reality; they depend on word meanings so their designated types are average, vague, piecemeal, and unconnected. WOLT, like theories in the natural-sciences, ignores reality and deduces from extreme theoretical concepts—to find clear, comprehensive, interrelated types.

A dozen reality-studying typologists saw Types 1, 2 and 3 quite accurately (Appendix 5, Table A5.2) but did not notice the Type 4. Yet they would all have studied Marx whose focus was the proletariat, in whose name world-shaking revolutions occurred during or near those theorists’ lifetimes. Appendix 4 discusses eight theorists who, like WOLT, deduced types from theoretical concept pairs; six of the eight identified the 4s.

3.6. 1-ism and 3-ism are opposed on almost everything; each has The Truth and seeks to quash the other. These are matters which *must* be decided. How? The fair way would be by all types voting but in daily life, pragmatism reigns. If society is a boxing ring, the 1s and 3s are the fighters, the 2s referee, and the 4s maintain the venue. The fighters appeal to the referee to rule in their favour; if the 2s’ rulings are unbiased, the 1s and 3s will score points but never a knockout. Both 1s and 3s oppose coercion yet can accept rulings if they can influence the rules and expect to win sometimes.

3.7. 2-ism prizes order and hierarchy; it implies no particular moral program. 2-ism will keep order for 1-ist warlordism, for 3-ist Killing Fields, or for 2-ist fascism. Management is hard so 2s favour proven practices but conservatism can be stultifying and lead to cover-ups. Ethical 2-ism is very important. Scholars endlessly ponder 1-ism and 3-ism (as right and left) but ignore 2-ism. Yet they are keenly aware that their own university administrations are intensely hierarchical.

3.8. Democracy allows the ways to coexist. Given four naturally occurring ideologies, the political division into left and right, seen in all the world’s democracies, is simplistic and indicates a

democratic deficit. It occurs because the parliamentary and electoral structures favour large parties. The sole exception is the Swiss structure which gives little power advantage to large parties so artificial alliances do not form. The result is four major parties corresponding to the WOLT four. The four have constituted the cabinet since 1943. Switzerland is, by every measure, the world's most successful country.

4. Five and only five

4.1. If people think competition and cooperation important and talk about their preferences for them, and if society is made of people's thoughts, then WOLT must apply. It must apply to all ethnicities, to hunter-gatherers, industrial society and space aliens as long as they discuss how they should live together.

There are countless social concepts for which people have preferences. Do deductions from pairs other than competition and cooperation produce the same four types? Yes: a consistent person cannot prefer a different society for every different pair of contrasting social values. If any relevant pair were found to unambiguously yield any other type, WOLT would be falsified.

Relevant is every matter which must be settled for people to live together. Appendix 1 deduces the consequences of half a dozen pairs. The deduction always yields the same go-getter 1s, order-loving 2s, concord-seeking 3s, and delivered-up 4s. Except for a couple of mistakes, the eight social scientists of Appendix 4 who deduced types from their own theoretical pairs all found the WOLT four; it seems no theorist has deduced any other types.

4.2. Competition and cooperation are socially important as are, for example, freedom, justice, and equality. If the following pairs (which are oppositions with large academic literatures) are placed on the Y and X axes of Table 1, each yields the types:

freedom-from and *freedom-to*
just process and *just outcome*
equality of opportunity and *equality of condition*²

² The 3s reject *equality of opportunity* because it leads to unequal power differences. The 1s reject *equality of condition* because it disincentivises individual effort. Type 2 is formed from both Y and X values. How can the two kinds of equality together give the 2-ist hierarchy? The personnel of a given rank all have equality of

The deductions are straightforward—see Appendix 1 which also deduces from several more pairs including the most fundamental exigency of all living things, *manage needs* and *manage resources*. How are the axial locations of these pairs of issues found? By deducing the types from them and seeing which axes they fall on.

4.3. Might the logical preferences for some presently unknown pair of social concepts lead to some other type(s)? No. Provided the two concepts are concerns which society must deal with, the four logical people must always deduce the same types. As arithmetic using fractions, decimals or percentages always yields the same answer, no pair of social issues can unambiguously yield a social type other than the WOLT five.

What if we have more than two concepts? We can always take any two of them at a time and these will form the WOLT four. There are, indeed, six kinds of justice (§8.3), not only *process* and *outcome*, and all find their places on the axes.

4.4. The deduction *from* personal axial values *to* types does not set causal direction: personal values don't necessarily cause worldview and social structure. In the real world, social interaction would mostly cause values. To be social means to account for oneself to others and to hold others to account, so social influence goes both ways. This would make personal beliefs and social practices mutually reinforcing and mutually correcting, and that would tend to weed out inconsistencies in beliefs and preference sets.

5. Values on an axis go together

5.1. The parts of society are now found—four ideologies or moralities plus one non-social position—and we can begin to see how values fit together. For example, the individualist Type 1 rejects X values and believes in the Y values of *competition*, *freedom-from*, *just process*, *equality of opportunity*—and many other Y issues (Appendix 2 lists a hundred items). The egalitarian Type 3 rejects Y values and wants X values of *cooperation*, *freedom-to*, *just outcome*, *equality of condition*, etc. The

condition; that is what rank means. They also have equal opportunity to win an equal prize of promotion. Surmounting contradictions using rules is the 2-ist forte.

hierarchical Type 2, positive on both Y and X, accepts them all, compromising and balancing with coercive rules. The fatalist Type 4 rejects them all as affectation or delusion. The Type 5 is not interested.

5.2. There is no flexibility. To work out where issues fit, deduce the types from a pair of issues and that will fix the issues' axial positions. With regard to any axis, to believe one issue is to believe them all; reject one, reject them all. A preference for, say, *just process*, logically requires a belief in *competition*, *freedom-from*, *equality of opportunity* and all the other Y values. In some sense the issues on an axis are the same; they go together, they are coherent; one can logically believe them all simultaneously. In theory, to know a person's view on one Y issue is to know their view on all Y issues; the same applies to the X values.

5.3. The dichotomies, *freedom-from* and *-to*, *just process* and *outcome*, *equality of opportunity* and *condition*, have been deliberated in philosophy for at least a century (as have many other oppositions). In philosophical logic the four combinations formed from two propositions are called the four "truth values" expressed as 1: Y not X, 2: Y and X, 3: X not Y, 4: not Y not X but, curiously, nowhere does the literature apply the logic to its dichotomies. So all discussion depends on word definitions. Since the relationships within each opposition are not rigorously set out, relationships between different oppositions are only very dimly discerned with no prospect of falsifiability.

5.4. In social and political life, much effort is devoted to conflict resolution. But why do we argue? All social animals squabble over resources but humans have more concerns. WOLT shows the pattern of these concerns. The fundamental, built-in moral contest of a talking species is the 1-3 rivalry based on Y and X preferences. Sitting with *competition* and *cooperation* on the Y and X axes are Kant's *price* and *dignity*, Marx's *capitalism* and *socialism*, Schütz's *um zu* and *weil*, Hirschman's *exit* and *voice*, Sowell's *constrained* and *unconstrained*, Kissinger's *conqueror* and *prophet*. Some other oppositions on Y and X are self-reliance and interdependence, *liberté* and *égalité*, pride and humility, deeds and words, integrity and sincerity, shame and guilt, retribution and forgiveness, individual rights and communal obligations, law and virtue, polytheism and monotheism, sovereignty and legitimacy.

5.5. In the modern world, the 1s and 3s argue over science, environment, tax policy, privatisation, animal welfare, industrial relations, defence, globalisation, advertising and consumerism. Each badgers the 2s, who run everything, to realise their ideas.

Historically, the 1-3 conflict was overshadowed by 2-ism in empires, feudalism and Catholicism, yet even in the most controlled societies, 1-ism provides the money and 3-ism supplies the rectitude. Democracy tames 2-ism, making the 1-3 clash more visible. It also makes the 4s fewer, more polite, and less expendable.

In the Western democracies, for a century and half, the political alliances of 1+2 versus 3+4 proved stable. The 1s and 2s needed each other to get the numbers to win government. But as 3-ist egalitarianism turned from workers' welfare to feminism, the environment, etc, the 4s were drawn to 1-ist glitter so the 1s no longer need the 2s and, in effect, the 1s can rule alone which is not stable. This does not apply to Switzerland where no party, hence no type, can rule and alliances do not form.

6. Three dimensions

6.1. There are Y issues, and X issues, and there is a third set of coherent issues called Z. The Z axis exists because there are three possible pair-wise divisions of four types. Consider *coercion*. According to the deductions at §2.2, Types 1 and 3 reject coercion and Types 2 and 4 accept it. Table 1 shows the Y axis distinguishes 1+2 from 3+4 and X divides 1+4 from 2+3. Thus coercion, which divides 1+3 from 2+4, is on Z. Each of the eight dimension theorists in Appendix 4 only used two axes but between them they used all three.

Deduction from coercion and competition, or from coercion and cooperation, also yields the four WOLT types. The Z axis is perpendicular to Y and X, and in Table 1 it lifts Types 2 and 4 above the page surface. (If Y and X are length and breadth, Z is height. If the four types were at the corners of a room on the floor, Z now raises Types 2 and 4 to the ceiling corners.) Z issues are fewer; they include *prescription*, *rules*, *authority*, *power-over*, *deference*, *pragmatism*, and they are ideologically neutral; Y and X issues are moral values; Z issues are vital ways of social interaction but they are not really values.

The parts and connections of the rational, social world are now identified. Way of life theory states that *society consists of four ways of life interrelated by three axes or dimensions which contain all the issues that must be dealt with for people to live together*. Each (extreme) position on any social issue has a fixed relationship to each position of every other issue.

Figure 2. A 3-D representation of the four social types




Figure 2. Positive is at the end with the label X, Y or Z. The corners of the cube represent the types. The antipode of each type is blank, thus no type utterly opposes any other. Geometric symmetry obtains: each type agrees with each other type about the issues that fall on their common axis and opposes each other type on the issues of the other two axes. Hence each type sees each other type is an ally on one set of issues and an opponent on two sets of issues. The four blank points are incoherent and for a person to change type requires a reversal of views on two axes, i.e. two sets of issues.

The cube is only an aid to visualisation. There exists no cube anymore than the numbers form a square in Table 1; the four points are in 3-D space instead of four points on a 2-D surface.

6.2. The Y axis has a general character of *doing* whereas X is an axis of *being*. Y is left brain, independent, admiring of achievement, primarily interested in things and abstractions, sees society as transactional, and seeks social esteem expressed as goods and services from others. X is right brain, communal, appreciating inner worth, primarily interested in living things and relationships, sees society as caring, and seeks social acceptance

expressed as group membership. Where Y emphasises facts and deeds, X emphasises harmony and words. Types 1 and 3 try to realise these directions in their pure forms.

The Y *doing* and X *being* tend masculine and feminine. The most intense forms of *doing* are almost entirely male: fighting, crime, computer coding, financial trading. The purest forms of *being* are strongly female concerns: fashion, décor, comfort, cosmetics, hairdressing. The pragmatic 2s, positive on both Y and X, use ranks and uniforms to express doing and being, while ritual turns words into deeds and rules classify people and formalise their roles and proper interactions.

The Z axis is about coercion where coercion means enforced rules and includes threat and promise, punishment and reward. The 2s, high on all three axes, prioritise order and duty; the 2-ist hierarchy applies Z to Y and X values to curb and harness the Y and X enthusiasms of the 1s and 3s. Rome tries to rule Athens and Jerusalem. The 4s, high on Z and rejecting Y and X, live in a coercive world where you keep your head down and grab what you can when you can. The three pro-active types have their principles; in Las Vegas the 4s buy their lottery tickets and do the work.

7. Value coherence across the axes

7.1. Three dichotomised axes imply eight types (a room has eight corners) but the other four are inconsistent and cannot logically exist. Putting + and – for *present* and *absent* (or yes and no, accept and reject), the valid X, Y, Z positions are: **1:** – + –, **2:** + + +, **3:** + – –, **4:** – – + (see this by reflecting on their stances on cooperation, competition, coercion, or by inspecting Figure 2) and the antipodes, + – +, – – –, – + +, + + –, do not exist.

Any issue—hence any axis—has two types for it and two against. As the plus and minus signs show, each type agrees with each other type on one axis and disagrees on two axes. So regarding any issue, each type has one ally and two adversaries. From the perspective of each type, all axial *issues* are meaningful but the three other *types* are not meaningful and are in error—mistaken, foolish or wicked. The non-social fifth type, where recognised, might be respected as a guru who has escaped worldly stresses and knows a higher reality.

7.2. Not only must the values on an axis be either all accepted or else all rejected but because there are only four types and it takes only two axes to actually determine a type, the third axis must fit with the other two.

For example, someone who accepts Z must either *accept* all the values on *both* X and Y (and thus be Type 2 + + +) or else *reject* all the values on *both* X and Y (Type 4 – – +). If, say, you accept *prescription* (§6.1) then you can accept *equality of opportunity* (§4.2) providing you also accept *just outcome* (§4.2). But if you reject *equality of opportunity* you must reject *just outcome*. These relationships are unknown to sociology.

7.3. The constraints of §7.1 and §7.2 show why we can often judge a person on quite brief acquaintance. Theoretically, to know two values is to know everything, provided the two values are on different axes. Appendix 2 lists dozens of axial issues; even if there are only twenty, WOLT makes thousands of specific relationship predictions—offering thousands of possibilities for falsification. For three attempts at empirical falsification, see Pepperday (2009) Chapter 7.

7.4. These WOLT constraints mean that a consistent person who switches preference on one issue must not only reverse all preferences on that axis but also on a second axis—and thus switch type. The person who admits to being wrong on one thing must admit to being wrong on most things. A single error augurs total conversion. Such a value shift implies new friends, a change of vocation, and different dress.

Thus WOLT explains why people find it hard to change their minds and sets out the possibilities of epiphany and surprise. Since any social type might convert to three other social types, it allows twelve permutations for radical conversion, in addition to the possibility of withdrawal to 5-ism (for examples see page T7 of Appendix 3).

8. Scope and limits

8.1. There is an unknown number of concept-pairs which yield the four WOLT types. The lists of Appendix 2 also include many pairs too specialised, or too general, or insufficiently contrasting, to deduce the types unambiguously—but which fit. Everything

must fit. Whatever does not fit cannot be a valid concept within the WOLT domain.

8.2. The WOLT domain includes all matters that talking beings must take a position on in order to live together—the gamut of social psychology, ethics, and policy making. WOLT is premised on sociality and on rationality so purely personal and emotional matters are outside its scope. It also can't apply to animals who don't express rational preferences and whose social relations are emotional. When people emotionally support their way of life (as is common), passion is serving reason.

8.3. From the relationality of value preferences we have deduced that four types span the breadth of morality. That same relationality is also the key to depth, to refining, perhaps subdividing, the types. If an axial issue is subdivided into two new issues these will be valid if their four combinations, formed as in §2.1, are the four types. In that case, the two new issues will lie on two axes and this will prompt consideration of the third. For example, *just process* on Y (§4.2) includes legal procedures for attributing blame which, in democracies, is either English or Roman law, realised as *adversarial* and *inquisitorial* court proceedings. It turns out these fit on the Y and Z axes and they then logically lead to *restorative* justice on X. (Pepperday 2009, 114). In principle, there is no limit to the depth or precision of type descriptions and their axial interconnections.

Normally, to refine concepts scholars employ subjective, language-dependent argument. Refinement of a WOLT type follows the same principle as the theory's derivation, namely by interrelating concepts, not defining them, where the relation must satisfy objective requirements of axial coherence (§7.2).

9. Summary and conclusion

Way of life theory shows that a creature which talks must adopt one of four social “ways of life” guided by three moral “dimensions.” The four ways are types of mindset and social structure labelled: 1 *individualist-doer*; 2 *hierarchist-ruler*; 3 *egalitarian-carer/critic*; 4 *fatalist-battler*. The three dimensions comprise two moralities labelled Y *competition-doing* and X *cooperation-being*, whose conflicting effects are mediated by Z *coercion-rules*. WOLT also finds a fifth type (the “hermit”) who is non-social. The five types are readily seen in reality.

WOLT is formed by the natural-science method, which is to hypothesise a relationship between theoretical concepts and deduce the consequences. Its premise is that people are rational and account, to other people, for their actions and attitudes. Deduction is simple and can be performed in numerous ways; anyone can work WOLT out. The theory excludes nuance, does not depend on definitions, and is falsifiable theoretically and empirically.

The three dimensions, or *axes*, contain social *issues*—all the concerns that must be settled for people to live together. Each issue has its axial location so every issue is inflexibly related to every other issue. The issues on the Y and X axes are *moral values*. Examples of contrasting Y and X values are: competition and cooperation, self-reliance and interdependence, just process and just outcome, equality of opportunity and equality of condition, retribution and forgiveness, pride and humility, deeds and words, shame and guilt, polytheism and monotheism.

The Y and X moralities are in dire conflict and the amoral Z dimension contains the prescriptive issues needed to keep the peace, such as coercion, deference, rules and pragmatism.

Y competitive, self-reliant doing leads to innovation, culling, and complementary activities; X cooperative, interdependent being promotes harmony, and common identity. Y fosters integrity, skill, brashness, and a psychological need to win and to be seen to win; X fosters sincerity, common cause, moralising, and a need for acceptance.

The individualist **Type 1** person or organisation believes in Y (competition) values and rejects X and Z. The egalitarian **Type 3** accepts X (cooperation) values and rejects Y and Z. The fatalist **Type 4** accepts Z (coercion) issues and rejects Y and X doctrines. The hierarchical **Type 2** accepts all three dimensions and keeps order by applying Z rules to the Y and X values of the 1s and 3s, and by directing the 4s. The 1s, 2s and 3s argue over principles; the 4s stay low and do the actual work.

Y, and striving, individualist 1-ism, is often selfish, but not self-centred. X, and social, egalitarian 3-ism, can be self-centred but is not selfish. Y without X leads to exploitation, oppression, gangsterism and warlordism. X without Y leads to utopianism,

cultism, class war and righteous extirpation. In case of either imbalance, Z may ensure orderly cruelty and killing.

Throughout history, might-is-right 2-ism and fatalistic 4-ism predominated but with the rise of education, technology and democracy, the 2s have been largely defanged, the 4s are fewer and less uncouth, and the conflict between the 1s and 3s is more prominent. Democratic stability may depend on a balance of 1-ism and 3-ism, upon impartial 2-ism, and upon the 4s' even-handed distrust.

The Y and X dimensions are the source of all moral principle. The nearest humans can get to a universal ethics is via ethical choice or compromise between the Y and X moralities via ethical Z enforcement. Day-to-day, established 2-ism makes the decision based on expertise and law but ultimately the only ethical criterion for the compromise is majority preference.

Such is the theoretical structure of society. The relationship between the individual and society has been a mystery for millennia. *Way of life theory* solves it for that part which concerns rational behaviour.□

10. References

Appendices: <https://www.pepperday.eu/wolt/appendices.html>

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