FIVE REASONABLE PEOPLE
THE UNDERLYING STRUCTURE OF MORALITY

CHAPTER 2. THREE DIMENSIONS

The previous chapter deduced the five WOLT types from *competition* and *cooperation*. It made it look easy to derive social arrangements from personal preferences. And so it is: just take two contrasting social concepts, assume theoretical persons will have extreme views of them and draw the consequences—the four persons' attitudes and preferred social arrangements—of the four possibilities.

This chapter introduces the Z axis, deduces the types from *coercion* and *cooperation*, and considers some implications of three dimensions.

CHAPTER 2 CONTENTS

A THIRD DIMENSION

Looking at Table 2.1 (which is a copy of Table 1.1) we see that the *yes* and *no* of the Y dimension separate the Types 1 and 2 from Types 3 and 4, and the X dimension separates Types 1 and 4 from Types 2 and 3. What of the possibility of a Z dimension separating the types on the diagonals, i.e., Types 1 and 3 from Types 2 and 4?

There are indeed issues that divide the types this way. *Coercion* for example. If you glance through the deductions of the five types in Chapter 1 you will see that Types 1 and 3 reject coercion and Types 2 and 4 accept it. The Z axis therefore exists and coercion is on it.

Table 2.1 Views of competition and cooperation on YX



Three dimensions cannot be shown on a two-dimensional page. Referring to Table 2.1, the Z dimension is perpendicular to the page surface and it raises Types 2 and 4 into the air above the page. If the four types were at the corners of a room on the floor, Z now raises Types 2 and 4 to the ceiling corners.

Table 2.2 Views of coercion and cooperation on ZX



If we view from the side of the room we would see the types as in Table 2.2—Types 2 and 4 are high on coercion and the other two types reject coercion. The situation with *cooperation* has, of course, not changed. In Table 2.2 it is Y *competition* which is perpendicular to the page, lifting Types 1 and 2 into the air.

DEDUCTION COERCION AND COOPERATION (ZX)

Before delving into the complexities of three dimensions, let us prove a point. Let us wipe the slate

clean and deduce, from first principles, the five types from *coercion* and *cooperation*.

A scientific theory consists of a relationship between two or more concepts. Let us, then, hypothesise a relationship between *coercion* and *cooperation* which, if we had units of measure, we could graph on two axes we might call Z and X. Having no units the only measurement we might agree on are the extremes of *presence* and *absence*. And so the graph degenerates to the four points shown in Table 2.2. In words:

1. reject both coercion and cooperation (not Z not X)
2. accept both coercion and cooperation (Z and X)
3. accept cooperation and reject coercion (X not Z)
4. accept coercion and reject cooperation (Z not X).

We have four hypotheses.[1] Are these 1,2,3,4 really the same as found in Chapter 1? We will see that they are but for now, let us ignore the deductions in the previous chapter and ask: If there are four theoretical persons who want these extreme states, and who reason with perfect logic, what sort of society would they want?

Type 1. To **reject both coercion and cooperation** in society, this Type 1 must be someone who says, "I can achieve on my own—and so can/should everyone." These individualistic 1s would be objecting to coercion and cooperation because they would get in the way of people doing what they want. This must mean the 1s think that people who appear to be cooperative actually seek to exploit the cover of cooperation in order to coerce. So 1s must think human nature is basically self-interested and social life is about personal competitive striving.

This is the same Type 1 which was derived from competition and cooperation in Chapter 1.

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[1] In terms of philosophical logic, the four truth values are: *1: not coerce not coop, 2: coerce and coop, 3: coop not coerce, 4: coerce not coop,* being the four possible relationships between the two concepts.

Type 2. The person who **prefers both coercion and cooperation** would be saying, "I willingly obey." Or rather, "*We* willingly obey." This must be a social arrangement where some people give orders and others carry them out: a hierarchy. Cooperation is usually cheaper and easier than coercion so the coercion would be mainly for those who don't, or mightn't, cooperate. This would not only be to get things done but also so that the morale of people who do cooperate is not undermined by those who do not.

Evidently, 2s see a human nature as inclined to do the wrong thing but capable of doing the right thing with encouragement or threat. For hierarchy to perform properly, it will be necessary for appropriately qualified (through learning, experience or noble birth) people to occupy positions of authority, And since everyone will need to know what their duties are, where everyone fits in, and how people can advance in rank, rules will be vital.

This Type 2 is obviously the same as before.

Type 3. People who **believe in cooperation and reject coercion** must want a cooperative community in which no one may tell anyone else what to do. That implies that no person may have more resources than anyone else because extra resources—money, guns, blue blood—would allow some to dominate. Competition would also be anathema since its effect (and its purpose) is to allow some to acquire more resources and more influence. Where the 1s see compulsion embedded in cooperation, the 3s see compulsion in the individualist quest to get ahead.

To cooperate without any command structure, human nature must be fundamentally good and harmony will be expected. If some people appear not to be good, it must be because they are corrupted by society and its greed, ambition and privilege.

This is the same Type 3 result.

Type 4. The 4s, who see **only coercion and no cooperation**, must think, like the 1s, that cooperation does not work, which implies that a person's word, and hence human nature, is fickle and not to be relied on. If coercion is pervasive the 4s must see themselves as being at the mercy of unpredictable forces which push them around.

The 4s, whether intimidated or proud of their toughness, will know it pays to keep your head down. To try anything—to study, strive, compete—is to invite trouble. So 4s may buy lottery tickets in the hope of escaping fourdom and seek the favour of powerful people in the hope of protection from the fates. With people being so unpredictable, coercion is what keeps them in line and gets things done.

This Type 4 is also the same.

Type 5 covers the possibility of a person with **no view** of coercion or cooperation. Not to have a view of these must mean one is not affected by them which must mean one is outside society…

FURTHER DERIVATIONS

As in the previous chapter, the above is pure theory. The five types deduced from extreme subjective views of coercion and cooperation turn out to be the same as the five deduced from views of competition and cooperation. All five are the same.

How reliable are the deductions? After all, I knew where I wanted the reasoning to go. Could, perhaps, some different types have been deduced? Or even just one type that is different? If that can be established, the theory is false. In the vast annals of philosophy and social science, there has never been a theory so exposed to refutation.

Because the types may be deduced from numerous concept pairs (see Appendix 1), the types themselves are independent of any particular pair. We have to conclude that WOLT is independent of any theorist's

opinion, just as theories in the hard sciences are. The five WOLT types are all the possible coherent moralities that exist.

The first table at Appendix 2 indicates that most social issues are on the X and Y axes. Z issues are far fewer; they are things you might expect to fit with coercion such as authority, deference, rules and ritual. The Types 1 and 3 are ideologies (free-market right and left in modern society) but Type 2, with its dependence on coercion and enthusiasm for order, is essentially ideology-free. The 4s' ideology can only be a fashionable conspiracy theory.

The WOLT types may also be deduced from *competition* and *coercion* (axes Y, Z). You might attempt this or, more ambitiously, you could use as dimensions any pair of moral issues, as long as they are contrasting enough to deliver an unambiguous result. Appendix 2 offers many suggestions.

Looking back through the deductions above, the types' attitudes to *human nature* were deduced. You could use human nature to deduce the WOLT types from first principles. Just put *bad* on Y and *good* on X (as in Table 2.1). This will have the 1s think it nasty, the 3s think it nice, the 2s think it is both, and the 4s think it neither which must mean it is capricious.

THE 3-D PATTERN

Table 2.1 shows the Y and X dimensions and Table 2.2 shows Z and X. We can also draw up a table showing Y and Z (which adds no new information). For reference purposes, all three patterns are set out in Table 2.3.

The axes are labelled *cooperation*, *competition* and *coercion* as a memory aid but their real names are X, Y and Z. The first table, the YX plane, is the most useful one for thinking about WOLT but all three are needed.

Table 2.3 The two-dimensional projections, YX, ZX, YZ



As Table 2.3 shows, the three axes are the three ways four items can be pair-wise opposed. The Y axis opposes Types 1 and 2 to Types 3 and 4, the X axis opposes Types 2 and 3 to Types 1 and 4, and the Z axis opposes 1 and 3 to 2 and 4. As such, any **issue**, or axis, has two types for it and two against it. The situation can be summarised as follows.

		Yes		No
X:	(coop)	2+3	v.	1+4
Y:	(comp)	2+1	v.	3+4
Z:	(coerc)	2+4	v.	1+3

Putting plus and minus symbols for yes and no, the **types** axial stances are as follows:

	X	Y	Z
Type 1:	–	+	–
Type 2:	+	+	+
Type 3:	+	–	–
Type 4:	–	–	+

We see that Type 2 says “yes” to all three axes whereas each of the other three types is positive on one axis and negative on the other two.

So on any particular relational issue, each **type** has one friend and two enemies. From each type’s point of view, all issues are meaningful but the three other

types are not meaningful; the other three types are composed of an incomprehensible combination of comprehensible issues.

Figure 2.1 attempts to illustrate the 3-D structure. If, in the tables showing two dimensions, the four types may be regarded as forming the corners of a square, then in three dimensions they would be at the corners of a cube.

Figure 2.1. A 3-D representation of the four social types



Figure 2.1. *Positive is at the end with the label X, Y or Z. The corners of the cube represent the types. The antipode of each type is blank; thus no type utterly opposes any other. Geometric symmetry obtains: each type agrees with each other type about the issues that fall on their common axis and opposes each other type on the issues of the other two axes. Hence a given type sees each other type is an ally on one set of issues and an opponent on two sets of issues. The four blank points are incoherent and for a person to change type requires a reversal of views on two axes, i.e. two sets of issues.*

Any axial ***issue*** *has two types against it and two for it. With respect to any particular issue a given* ***type*** *has one ally and two enemies. From the perspective of each type, all* ***issues*** *are meaningful but the three other types are not meaningful; the other three types are composed of an incomprehensible (mistaken, foolish or wicked) positions on comprehensible issues.*

The cube is only an aid to visualisation. There exists no cube anymore than there exists a square; the four

points are in 3-D space instead of four points on a 2-D surface.

The three axes with their three sets of issues are orthogonal (at right angles) which is to say they are mutually independent and the issues on one axis can be added to or reduced without affecting anything on the other axes.

The directions of positive and negative (yes and no, presence and absence, plus and minus) on each axis are in principle arbitrary, however they do mostly correspond to the intuitive direction of positive and negative. Exceptions to that are mainly on the Z axis, where about half the known issues have positive meaning in the minus direction (see Appendix 2). Geometrically, the spatial relationships between the four positions are symmetrical and it makes no difference which way up the cube of Figure 2.1 might be drawn.

SOME RELATIONAL CONSEQUENCES

Every social concept (belief, value, orientation, preference, concern…) has to be either a relational issue on one of the three axes, or else be a characteristic of one of the five types.

What is the difference between axial *relational issues* and *type characteristics*? The issues are components of the types. Axial issues tend to be particular concerns or policies whereas type characteristics are ways of life which are general mindsets, orientations, moralities, isms, ideologies, worldviews—along with social structure.

Still, many things are both an axial issue and a type feature. For example, competition is a Y issue and it also characterises 1-ism. The urge to win is in the Type 1 soul. Note that the 2s are also high on Y and competition for high rank can be fearsome, and war, the ultimate competition, is made by opposing 2-isms, yet we wouldn’t say competition characterises 2-ism.

The 2-ist soul yearns for orderliness and orderliness is a 2-ist specialty; it does not go on any axis.

Predictions

The three axes each carry dozens of issues—see Appendix 2. There is no flexibility, no nuance: the theoretical person who has a preference concerning one issue on an axis has the corresponding preference for all the other issues on that axis. Believe one, believe them all; reject one, reject them all. This implies an enormous number of testable predictions—many more than have previously existed in the whole of social science.

Yet there are more predictions—a lot more. The theoretical rational person's preference for one item on, say, the X axis predicts a preference for all the X items and that person will also have a preference for an item on the Y axis. This of coourse predicts all Y preferences but now, given those X and Y preferences, they *also* predict all Z preferences. Because there are only four, not eight, types, two axes suffice to define a type. And to specify a type is to specify all preferences on all axes. In theory, knowledge of a person's position on *two issues* on any two different axes predicts the person's *every belief*.[2]

Theoretically, the psychological consequence of reversing one's opinion on a single issue requires reversal of opinion on all issues on that axis. But that is not enough. To reverse all your opinions of only one axis would result in a non-viable position (either two positive axes or three negative) so you must reverse all issues on a *second* axis. That is, to reverse a preference on a single issue requires a reversal of preference for all issues of two axes. To change one's mind is a big deal.

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[2] Since real people are not perfectly rational, we may need to know positions on, say, four issues. This was my tactic when attempting to test WOLT against reality.

The relationships of the axes imply thousands of specific, testable predictions. For example, referring to Appendix 2, a person in favour of positive freedom (+X) who abhors competition (-Y) must dislike rules (-Z). This has probably never occurred to any scholar.

Similarly, if you hold human nature good (+X) and at the same time believe in self-reliance (+Y), it is then logically impossible for you to reject ritual (+Z). Who would have thought it? Correspondingly, the person who thinks human nature good and rejects self-reliance must reject ritual. Who knew? WOLT yields any number of such curious predictions.

We begin to see the point of all this theorising: to find out things we didn't know. From Galileo on, the scientific approach of deducing the consequences of an extreme, idealised relationship between extreme idealised concepts has produced surprising results, results that were hard to believe, results that, sometimes, people didn't want to believe. Of course, we now live in more enlightened times.

THE MEANING OF THE THREE AXES

WOLT shows there are just 3 sets of relational issues (concerns, policies) and just five possible ways of life (isms, worldviews). This allocation of everything in the rational, social world—values, moral principles, preferences, organisational structures, modes of interaction—to three dimensions and five types, suggests that all the items on a particular dimension or within a particular type are in some sense the same. That does not mean they are identical, any more than all solids, or all liquids, are identical.

The states of matter, solid, liquid, gas, make a convenient analogy. Concrete and steel are similar in that they are both solids—but are not identical. Analogously, *competition* and *human nature bad* are both Y issues but not identical. Solids like concrete and steel differ systematically from liquids such as water and petrol. Analogously, the Y values, *competition* and *human nature bad*, differ

systematically from X values such as *cooperation* and *human nature good*.

We do not have to be expert on a topic to find its place. There is a vast literature on concrete and steel but we don't need it to classify them as solids. The comparably vast literature on solids, liquids and gases is also not needed. It is similar with WOLT types. The libraries of social science literature can be useful but we can generally locate and interrelate values and social arrangements with being expert.

Meaning is relational

Scholarship attempting to understand the concepts—the values and preferences called relational issues—which constitute WOLT's axes goes back millennia. All of it is dependent on definitions. The scholarship may be useful (though not greatly) but it isn't science and it cannot generate theory. For understanding to be *scientific* rather than opinion, it must be via relationships, not definitions. To be scientific the theorist must turn away from reality and *hypothesise a relationship between theoretical concepts and deduce the consequences*. It is via their interrelationships that we understand concepts; such relationships remain valid irrespective of scientists' various opinions as to the definitions of the concepts.

WOLT establishes the meaning of a social concept by specifying its dichotomised location on an axis. We deduce this location by comparing it with some contrasting concept—which establishes that concept's location also. These locations mean that pair of concepts is now related to all other social concepts. Every social thing is related—rigidly related—to every other social thing.

Subdividing an axial issue

The concepts on the axes are dichotomised. An axial concept may be sometimes be refined to obtain a deeper understanding. If the reasoning in these two chapters is valid, then the way to do this is to *divide*

the single axial issue itself into a further contrasting pair of issues which also fit on the axes. In theory there would be no limit to such "fractal" sub-dividing of issues. There are two known examples of this. They concern power and justice. In Chapter 10 *power-over* on Z is divided into X *empathy*, Y *influence*, and Z *domination*. In Appendix 1 *just process* on Y is divided into X *restorative justice*, Y *adversarial justice* and Z *inquisitorial justice*.

Caution about causes

WOLT was derived here by deducing the consequences of a hypothesised relationship between idealised concepts. These deductions, here and in the previous chapter (and in Appendix 1), are *from* axial issues *to* types. This seems to be the straightforward way to go about it, however issues are not *prior* to types. It is possible to deduce in reverse—from types to issue locations—and in fact the Z axis was inferred above from the type positions of *coercion* found in the previous chapter.

Similarly, deduction is not cause: we can't say that issues *cause* types. The detective who examines a footprint and deduces that the burglar was a tall man is not saying the footprint *caused* the burglar's height and sex. We can specify interrelationships between concepts but not that any particular concept causes another. There is a great deal of philosophical discussion of "cause" but it does not seem very relevant to science theorising. WOLT shows how everything fits together and all we can say is that everything causes everything else. In the language of social science, we have in WOLT no "dependent" or "independent" variables; the types and the axes determine each other. Such circularity (or "tautology") is quite usual in scientific theories.

Only three axes

How do we know there are not more than three axes? Because there are only four types and four points in

space can define a maximum of three dimensions. Presumably, if there were any more points some pair of contrasting concepts would have delivered them at some stage.

Three dimensions imply eight points in space—a room has eight corners—but the other four positions, the antipodes, the precise opposites of the types,

+ – +, – – –, – + +, + + –

are blank; they do not exist. No type exists which is positive on just two dimensions or negative on all three. Those positions cannot exist for they are illogical.

A simple example of this is that it is not possible to have both competition and cooperation without some coercive rules to resolve the contradictions between them. Think of sport or commerce or war.

A parallel theoretical example is classical liberalism. The aim of liberalism is to be high on competition and cooperation and low on hierarchy. This is incoherent. Page T4 of the Ways of life table at Appendix 3 gives a brief historical overview of liberalism.

CONCLUSION

This chapter, like Chapter 1, posited a relationship between extremes of two ordinary concepts and deduced the consequences in the normal manner of science theorising. The same five types were found as previously.

The same five social types were found but the interrelationship between the types was expanded by another axis, Z. This showed that Types 2 and 4 have something in common (the Z issues) and the 1s and 3s also have something in common, namely rejection of the Z issues.

In sociology and social psychology it is wholly unknown that all social values and beliefs fall into one of three groups, let alone that they are rigidly interrelated. The three axes' patterns of concord and

opposition summarised in Table 2.3 apply to every matter that has to be sorted out for people to live together. Each social issue (competition, good human nature, coercion, just process, etc) fits on one of three axes and has two types for it and two against. By showing how each social thing is related to every other social thing WOLT makes thousands of specific predictions.

It is a commonplace to declare that everything is related; WOLT shows specifically *how* everything is related.

There are a few further complications to do with positives in the negative direction (see Chapter xx) but the explanation so far has covered WOLT's essential theory and should suffice to make subsequent chapters comprehensible.□