APPENDIX 4
WAY OF LIFE THEORY
OTHERS' TYPES FROM DIMENSIONS

Eight theorists who form social types from two dimensions are known. Apart from a couple of mistakes, they all get the same types as WOLT.

CONTENTS

Theorising from dimensions

Taking a pair of concepts and forming the four combinations from them is occasionally done in social science. It is generally thought of as a device to generate a convenient classification system and it is universally assumed that different pairs generate different sets of four types. I have come across eight social theorists who can be said to derive *social types* from two concepts and though they use widely varying pairs of concepts they do not find different types. Save for a couple of mistakes, they all find the same types.

There are also scholars who form types intuitively, without any dimensions. A couple of dozen of these intuitive typologies are discussed in Appendix 5. Other than Marx's proletariat, none of these intuitive typologists noticed the Type 4, and none the Type 5.

There is also a large number of thinkers who posit two dimensions but do not form the four types from them. The best known would be Emile Durkheim's *integration* and *regulation*, which are WOLT's X and Z dimensions. All these non-typologising dimensioneers used either X and Y or X and Z; none use Y and Z. For an overview of these schemes see my PhD thesis.

The eight theories treated below may be regarded as subsets of WOLT in the sense that each theorist uses only two dimensions—though between them

they use all three. Some of these theories I mention elsewhere leading to some repetition but this appendix collects them all in one place.

Bowles's social interactions

Economist Samuel Bowles (1998: 86) draws on Max Weber to say human interactions may be *personal* or *impersonal*, and they may be *ephemeral* or *durable*. Thus interactions are: 1, impersonal and ephemeral which, Weber says, characterises the *ideal market*; 2, impersonal and durable, which characterises *bureaucracy*; 3, personal and durable, characterising *community*; and 4, personal and ephemeral, characterising *ascribed market*. These he sets out as in Table A4.1.

Table A4.1. Bowles: social interactions (impersonal / durable) YX

The type numbers are mine but the words are his. The terms for Types 2 and 3 he takes from Talcott Parsons. *Ascribed market* is his own term: "Racially segmented spot labor markets are an example, as they are personal (the racial identities of the participants matter) but the contact among participants is not on-going." (86) He could not have picked a better illustration of a Type 4 delivered up to fate and the caprice of powerful people.

The fit is perfect: from two chosen kinds of social interaction Bowles deduces the same four types as WOLT. We see from his types that his dimensions are Y (1+2 v 3+4) and X (1+4 v 2+3).

Bowles's deduction is clear and concise but he is not concerned to further elucidate his types; rather, he has a 3-ist program to investigate the social consequences of markets; he draws on the economics, game theory, sociology and anthropology literature to conclude (1998: 105) that the concept "market failure" should be broadened to include the market's undesirable moral effects on people's preferences.

Marriott's transactional strategies

Anthropologist McKim Marriott draws on south Indian ethnographies to construct a model of castes and transactions which "leads to the finding that a culturally adapted two-dimensional model, apparently simple and uniform, can nevertheless generate some of the Indian civilization's fabled diversity." (Marriott 1976: 109)

He explains that in south India everything which can be the substance of social transaction, from food to wisdom, is imbued with "substance code," a sort of vital energy. Substance code varies between gross and subtle depending on the substance, and in general it is better to give than to receive because transference of substance code signals rank.

Marriott's two dimensions, low and high *giving*, and high and low *receiving*, create four "transactional strategies". Table A4.2 sets out his terms for the four situations so created and gives examples from the many he identifies from Indian ethnographies. The type numbers are, of course, mine.

Table A4.2. **Marriott: transactional strategies (giving / receiving) YX**

The maximal 1s are people who do a lot of transacting, and who balance the giving and receiving to keep the substance code transference equal. The minimal 3s also keep a balance as guilds and sects with few transactions. Thus both 1s and 3s are neutral with respect to rank. The optimal 2s maximise rank through giving (subtle) substance code while the pessimal 4s (Sudra is the lowest caste) depend on receiving (gross) substance code.

So Marriott produced, from Hindu implications of *giving* and *receiving*, the same four types as Bowles found from a pair of characteristics of social interaction in the modern West. Both theorists also arrived at the same division of the four types: 1+2 v 3+4 and 1+4 v 2+3, i.e., the WOLT axes Y and X.

Table A4.2 tabulates the effects of giving and receiving but where is rank shown? Rank is more or less the point of the giving and receiving. In order to indicate *rank difference*, which does not appear in either row or column, Marriott turns to "diagonals" (the term is from Ostrander 1982: 26). He observes that the states of so-called optimal and pessimal transactions (the "diagonal" 2-4 in Table A4.2) are *asymmetric* with regard to rank, whereas the maximal and minimal arrangements (diagonal 1-3) are *symmetric* because the net substance code (quality and quantity) of giving and receiving balances in each. As one moves in the diagonal direction from Type 4 to Type 2, *rank itself* increases from negative to positive.

Marriott's dimensions are continuums, not abrupt rows and columns, and his four types are at the corners of a rectangle. The various castes and occupations are plotted in it so the diagonals appear more plausible there than they do as the bare dichotomous bones of Table A4.2.

In a way, Marriott has introduced the third dimension onto the two-dimensional page. He can do this because the issue on his third dimension happens to be a measure of difference. Normally this is not the case so in general it is not possible (unfortunately) to simplify the representation of the three dimensions by referring to "diagonals". As we know, the third dimension, Z, is perpendicular to the other two dimensions and lifts Types 2 and 4 above the page surface. In Marriott's case the Z axis is a dimension of increasing *rank difference* (not rank per se) from below, where the 1s and 3s know no ranking, to above, where the 2s and 4s are ruled by it.

In his 1976 paper, Marriott acknowledges (138) Mary Douglas's comments on earlier drafts. There is no recognition there of any correspondence to her grid-group theory. This correspondence was later noticed by Ostrander (1982: 21) who finds Marriott's types to be the same as Douglas's four grid-group types but is puzzled by the layout of the dimensions: "the correspondence between the two schemes remains illusory because the dimensions used are not congruent, even though the resulting types are." His perplexity arises from Marriott's use of issues that happen to be on the Y and X axes, whereas Douglas's grid and group are Z and X dimensions.

Marriott thought his "expansion of a Hindu ethnosociology of transactions… may suggest some potentialities for the development of diverse and productive ethnosociologies elsewhere, and for an expansion of the social sciences that have arisen in the West." (1976: 137) It could have done so but though he became a prominent indologist, his work is almost unknown outside Indian sociology (Gerow 2000) and his model fell by the wayside apart from its mention for illustrative type examples by grid-group writers (e.g. Gross and Rayner 1985: 8, Ostrander 1982: 21ff).

Douglas's grid-group theory

Anthropologist Mary Douglas sought a way to compare the cultures of African and other tribes. She first published what was to become known as grid-group theory in 1970. Her clearest version is from 1978, reprinted in Douglas (1982 [1978]). Grid-group theory gave rise to a considerable literature and is the only one of these eight dimensional typologies to have achieved recognition outside its own field.

Douglas divides the social world into dimensions of *grid* and *group*. By *grid* she means the extent to which social arrangements restrict people's life options, i.e. are prescriptive. *Group* is the extent to which people belong to a group and are interdependent. She dichotomises each into weak and strong, yielding four social contexts named as shown in Table A4.3 (type numbers are mine).

Table A4.3. **Douglas: social contexts (grid / group) ZX**

Notwithstanding the terms *weak* and *strong*, she continues as if her dimensions are discrete (such as no/yes). The reasoning is straightforward: 1: where both social prescriptions and group obligations are weak, individuals negotiate life in an independent, entrepreneurial environment; 2: Where both prescription and group obligation are strong there is hierarchy; 3: Where prescription is weak no one has authority so if *group* is to persist, people must be equal and human nature benign to allow people to cooperate without coercion; 4: People caught in a highly prescriptive environment without group support will be isolated battlers whose lives are controlled by others.

From her two dimensions, Douglas deduces, with relentless logic, further characteristics of the four social environments and from them infers, at some length, corresponding cosmologies or worldviews (Douglas 1982 [1978]: 205).

Then she adds, ad hoc, a fifth type, the voluntarily withdrawing hermit, who is not included in her two dimensions. She added him (5s are mostly male) because she saw him in reality and recognised his position was not determined by grid or group or any kind of social relations but was self-selected. Adding a type ad hoc undermines the theory for if one further type can just be tacked on, what prevents adding others? Some theorists made imaginative attempts to include the hermit within the grid-group scheme (see Mamadouh 1999 for an overview) but no logic supports them and most grid-group writing acts as if the hermit does not exist.

Douglas's two dimensions of social relations allowed her to deduce extended characteristics of the four social types. Her types—which are the WOLT types—are very recognisable in the real world and her theory became well known in political science and sociology with hundreds of papers applying it. (It became lost to anthropology because anthropologists are 3s and don't like categorising.)

Way of life theory is the end result of my seeking to solve grid-group's logical problems. The hermit arises naturally and necessarily when the derivation is from perceptions, not from social relations. Another awkwardness was the puzzle of *competition*. It is a fundamental kind of interaction and for a while it became a running sore in the grid-group literature. Various attempts (e.g., Mars 1994 [1982]: 29, Ostrander 1982, Thompson 1996) to set it on both

grid and group axes were not persuasive. With no Y axis, they could not succeed and the issue was left unresolved in the grid-group literature.

Bowles, Marriott, and Douglas generated the same four types. Though they are from different academic fields, use different dimensional issues, seek to explain very different cultures, and use various vocabularies, they arrive at the same four social types. It is a confirmation that the four are universal and there exist no others.

Ouchi's economic exchange conditions

In a much cited paper, organisation theorist William G Ouchi (1980) sees two dimensions of economic exchange conditions which he calls *goal incongruence* and *performance ambiguity*. The first is a situation where people seek different goals, where goals do not overlap and the actors have different agendas. The second prevails where it is difficult to assess the contributions of individuals such as where teams are involved in complex processes.

Different combinations of these give rise to three basic mechanisms of mediation or control: 1: markets, which are efficient when performance ambiguity is low and goal incongruence is high; 2: bureaucracies, which are efficient when both goal incongruence and performance ambiguity are moderately high; and 3: clans, which are efficient when goal incongruence is low and performance ambiguity is high. (Ouchi 1980: 129)

Table A4.4. **Ouchi: economic exchange conditions YX**

The numbers in Table A4.4 are mine. To clarify: 1: It is a basic property (and alleged merit) of the market that no one is interested in what anyone's goals are. Performance contributions of all parties are unambiguously spelt out in the contract and rewarded in money (which reflects supply and demand). 2: A bureaucracy copes with people's different goals where joint effort means individual contributions cannot be costed; it remunerates according to rank or seniority. 3: The slogan *From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!* encapsulates performance ambiguity where remuneration is unrelated. The intrinsic rewards of affinity and common purpose should trump monetary reward. Ouchi did not notice the Type 4 but we can easily fit it: for people who do not interact and who depend on fate, goals and performance are without meaning.

Those descriptions of the 1s and 3s suggest that for Ouchi's two issues a classic economics pair might be substituted: Y *scarcity theory* and X *labour theory*.

Ouchi's dimensions are idiosyncratic but comprehensible and the types he derives are clear. It is curious that he misses Type 4 but his purpose is not primarily to set out a general theory of social relations; his object is to show which kind of organisation—market, bureaucracy or clan—will be the efficient environment for which kinds of collective tasks. His tripartite division is standard among organisation theorists (Colebatch and Larmour 1993).

Knoke's power types

Power is perhaps political science's most intractable idea. Political sociologist David Knoke declared that "some scheme is necessary to order the diversity" of the various conceptions of it so he invented the dimensions of *influence* and *domination*.

Influence, says Knoke, is the sort of power the doctor has if you take the medicine he prescribes. When you freely buy a product, you and the seller have *influence* over each other in the reciprocal deal. *Domination* is the power of a person who controls you "by offering or withholding some benefit or harm." ([Knoke 1990: 4](#))

Table A4.5. Knoke's power types (influence/domination) YZ

His four kinds of power are shown in Table A4.5 (the type numbers are mine) and they are straightforwardly the WOLT types but Type 3 needs further discussion.

Knoke puts the quote marks on the 3s' "power" because his table shows the 3s have no power. But this cannot be. Power here is the type that theorists call "power-over" and it has a special property, a property not possessed by other relational issues: it is zero-sum, meaning what one person has, another cannot have. (We recognise this colloquially when we speak of a "power vacuum.") In a given society, a certain amount of power over people is available. Table A4.5 would have it that in 3-ist society no one has any power over anyone. But 3-ism is by no means a power-free zone; it is just that the 3s reject those two kinds of power. *Five reasonable people* shows there is a power on the X axis, which is absent from Table A4.5, called *empathy*.

Knoke alone of these eight theorists uses the Y and Z dimensions. Everyone else uses X (along with either Y or Z) because X is the distinction between the individual the collective, which is the distinction everyone sees and which has been the primary social division since Maine and Tönnies in the nineteenth century.

Power is a big topic to which *Five reasonable people* devotes two chapters. They discuss the five types of power and their interconnections not only via three (not two) power dimensions but show there are *two sets* of three power dimensions. Real world examples are also discussed.

Merton, Triandis, Swanson

Sociologist Robert K Merton (1938) sets *cultural goals* and *institutional norms* as Y and X dimensions dichotomised as *accept* and *reject*, and derives— he is too discursive for us to say he "deduces"—four types of which Types 1, 2 and 4 are clear. The Type 3 accepts norms and rejects goals but instead of Type 3 Merton finds "ritualism" which is "the psychosis of the bureaucrat" (673).

Merton is interested in deviance and his discussion is distorted by his presumption that all the types except Type 2 (whom he describes quite accurately yet seems to think of as a kind of a nice free market (674, 677)) are social deviants. He has no conception of a Type 3 who accepts society's *norms* of proper behaviour while rejecting *goals* such as money and personal recognition, and who is by no means ritualistic but works within social norms to show such goals are misguided.

Cross-cultural psychologist Harry Triandis sets Z and X dimensions of *sameness* and *interdependence* and identifies the 1s, 2s and 3s clearly but misses the 4s, finding instead a variation of Type 1. This is because "sameness" is too vague, because he fails to distinguish ascribed status from achieved status (Foladare 1969, Linton 1936), and because he forms his types as a pastiche of deduction and induction from empirical data (Triandis 1995: 44, Triandis 2001, Triandis and Gelfand 1998) instead of deducing strictly from his dimensions. Triandis is the doyen of cross-cultural psychology and his four part typology has some currency. An essay in Pepperday (2009: Appendix 4) explains how, with its inconsistencies repaired, his scheme delivers the same four types as Douglas, Bowles and Marriott.

Anthropologist Guy Swanson's (1969) two dimensions are very abstract and his types are only slightly clearer. Ostrander (1982) interprets them as Douglas's grid-group four and inasmuch as they are comprehensible, they seem to be.

Summary and conclusion

An overview of the eight theorists is given by Table A4.6. These are all the people I know of who derive social types from two dimensions.

Table A4.6. Eight theorists' types and dimensions

Bowles 1998	1	2	3	4		X	Y			economics
Marriott 1976	1	2	3	4		X	Y	(Z)		anthropology
Douglas 1970	1	2	3	4	5	X		Z		anthropology
Ouchi 1980	1	2	3			X	Y			organisation theory
Knoke 1990	1	2	3	4			Y	Z		political science
Merton 1938	1	2		4		X	Y			sociology
Triandis 1995	1	2	3			X		Z		psychology
Swanson 1969	1	2	3	4		X		Z		sociology

What is the difference between these eight dimensional typologies and WOLT? The vital difference is that WOLT recognises all three dimensions. As each of those eight theories set out, two dichotomised dimensions give four truth values or types. But given four types, there are three ways the four may be opposed in pairs so there is potentially a third dimension. WOLT follows through on that.

One result is that whereas those theorists showed that some scattered, idiosyncratic pairs of concepts yield the four types, WOLT shows that *all* pairs of quite *ordinary* matters *always* yield the four social types. And whereas these eight thinkers give us just eight quirky dimension pairs, Appendix 2 lists a hundred pairs, most of them quite plain.

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